Brian D. Burns v. Lowell V. Summerhays and Victor Lawrence : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Brian D. Burns v. Lowell V. Summerhays and Victor
Lawrence : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Victor Lawrence; Appearing as Pro Se Defendant/Appellant.
Ralph C. Petty; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Burns v. Summerhays, No. 950668 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6902
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 ,_ 
DOCKET NO. 
V3Q 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C., d/b/a 
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and 
VICTOR LAWRENCE, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
: Case No. 950668-CA 
: Priority No. 3crb 
• Priority No. 1 5 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE BURNS 
APPEAL FROM THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, HONORABLE ROBIN RF;«SE PRESIDING 
Victor Lawrence, Esq., 
Appearing as Pro Se Defendant/ Appellant 
10 West Broadway, Suite 211 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)359-1800 
Ralph C. Petty, Esq., 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Brian D. Burns D.C., d/b/a 
Burns Chiropractic Clinic 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6686 
FILED 
MAR 2 6 1996 
)T A C ADDCA 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities iii 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of Issues 
Issue #1 1 
Issue #2 1 
Issue #3 2 
Determinative Authority 2 
Statement of the Case 2 
Statement of the Facts 3 
Summary of Arguments 5 
Argument 
POINT I: 
LAWRENCE BREACHED HIS DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN HE 
FAILED TO DISTRIBUTE THE PERSONAL INJURY PROCEEDS TO 
THE ASSIGNEE AND LIEN HOLDER, DR. BURNS 6 
A. Lawrence's Advice and Assistance Established 
an Attorney-Client Relationship 8 
B. Payment of a Fee, or Lack of Payment, Does Not 
Destroy the Attorney-Client Relationship . . . 12 
C. The Rules of Professional Conduct May be 
Utilized to Establish the Standard of Care . . 12 
POINT II: 
LAWRENCE'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
WAS PROPERLY DENIED 15 
Conclusion 19 
Addendum 21 
Addendum A Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Addendum B Judgment 
Addendum C Medical Reports and Doctor's Lien 
Addendum D Assignment of Benefits 
Addendum E January 14, 1992 Letter from Defendant Lawrence 
to Plaintiff 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Page 
Ashton v. Skeen. 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073 (1935) . . . . 10, 14 
Bonanza Motors Inc. v. Webb. 104 Idaho 234, 657 P.2d 1102 
(Idaho App. 1983) 11, 14 
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716, 727 
(Utah App. 1990) 8, 12 
Brinkman v. Moskowitz. 38 Misc. 2d 950, 238 N.Y.S.2d 876, 
876-77 (1962) 11, 14 
Cannon v. Wright. 531 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1975) 17 
Charleston v. Hackett. 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2nd 1176 
(1961) 17 
Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989) . . . . 2, 17 
Harline v. Campbell. 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986) 17 
Kurtenbach v. TeKippe. 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977) 9 
Margulies ex rel. Marcrulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 
1199-1200 (Utah 1985) 2 
Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang. 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980) . . 17 
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989) . . 17 
Waldman v. Levine. 544 A.2d 683 (D.C. App. 1988) 12 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App. 1991) 16, 17, 19 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2) (d) 1 
Other Authorities 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article VIII, Section 3 . 1 
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13 2, 7, 14 
iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is established by the Constitution of the State 
of Utah pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 and pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2) (d) , which confers upon the Court of Appeals 
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from Circuit Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue #1: 
Did the trial court err in holding that Appellant Lawrence 
entered into an attorney-client relationship with Ward by endorsing 
a personal injury settlement check, depositing it into his trust 
account, and disbursing the proceeds? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews mixed 
questions of law and fact in relation to professional malpractice 
by the abuse of discretion standard. Mixed questions of law and 
fact do not warrant the deference that is due findings of questions 
of pure fact. Margulies ex rel. Maraulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 
1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985). 
Issue #2: 
Did the trial court err in holding that Lawrence had a duty to 
third parties claiming an interest in the proceeds of the personal 
injury action? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews mixed 
questions of law and fact in relation to professional malpractice 
by the abuse of discretion standard. Mixed questions of law and 
fact do not warrant the deference that is due findings of questions 
1 
of pure fact. Maraulies ex rel. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 
1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985). 
Issue #3: 
Did the trial court err in denying Lawrence's motion to 
dismiss or for a directed verdict based on an Assignment of 
Benefits and Doctor's Lien executed by Ward? 
Standard of Review: Questions of fact are reviewed by the 
Court of Appeals under the clearly erroneous standard. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 1.13 Safekeeping Property. 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which 
a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as 
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by 
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly 
deliver to the client or third person any funds or other 
property that the client or third person is entitled to 
receive and, upon request by the client or third person, 
shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such 
property. 
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Burns, a chiropractic physician, brought this action 
against the Defendants Lawrence and Summerhays, attorneys 
representing John L. Ward, for payment of money received by 
Defendants, but belonging to Dr. Burns. Summerhays represented 
Ward in a personal injury action which resulted in a settlement and 
recovery from an insurance company. The proceeds from the 
2 
:i i ISUI ai ice sett] ement wer e del iver ed to 1 <awr ence for distribution. 
Lawrence distributed the proceeds to Summerhays and Ward, receiving 
n o n e for himSelf . Thereafter, Ward f :I ] ed bankr i iptc} r, 1 :i sti i lg D: : 
Burns as a creditor and seeking to discharge this obligation Dr 
Burns sued Summerhays and Lawrence to recover for his medical 
ser " : *~- ' 1 : ~ * :" " 4 m •* *~ha} rs and I jav\ e I: :i read: .:-.;..-:. > 
him . aiscLibaLiiig -he proceeds without satisfying his claim. 
After the commencement of 1 ne rriai : * Burns and Summerhays 
se111 ed t h e :i r ci:i s p u t e and * . ns t Si irnnie r hay s was 
dismissed, Summerhays, however, testified as a witness at trial. 
The r rifl' * ~v. ' found that Lawrence wrongful!;r distributed the 
I i isui : ai ice proceeds and awarded Dr Burns a judgment 
against Lawrence. 
Immed i a t e 1 y up on the e n t r y o f t: h e j i ldgme n t:, I , aw r e n c e f i ] e d 
this appeal before the Utah Court- of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1 Burns treated John Ward in May of 1990. R. 197, 367. 
2 • l'c nsi ire pa,} orient, Ward executed an as si gnment of bei lef i ts 
and P doctor's lien in favor of Dr. Burns. R. 197 These 
documents were prepared by Dr. Burns' office. R. 368. DT Burns 
w o ii 1 < ^  i i < > i • "'I t ^1; ;r < :" z o 111: i n u e d p r o v :i d :i n g t r e a t in e i I t: s t: o W a i: ! • . 
receive r::; coctor's lien and assignment of benefits on the 
proceeds of the personal injury action. R 369. 
3 . i •. •-
of Summerhays' office staff. R. 197. 
3 
4. Late in 1991, the personal injury action of Ward was 
settled. Summerhays negotiated the settlement with the insurance 
company and instructed the insurance company to make a check 
payable to Lawrence and Ward. R. 198. 
5. In September, 1991, Lawrence initiated a call to 
Summerhays. Summerhays and Lawrence discussed the value of Ward's 
personal injury claim. Summerhays told Lawrence that Dr. Burns had 
a lien against the settlement proceeds and informed Lawrence of 
Summerhays' attorney's fees. R. 198. 
6. In December, 1991, Lawrence, Summerhays, and Ward met in 
Lawrence's office. The meeting was arranged by Summerhays. R. 
379. At that meeting, Lawrence and Ward endorsed the settlement 
check. R. 198. 
7. Summerhays instructed Lawrence and Ward to endorse the 
settlement check and instructed Lawrence to deposit that check. R. 
381. After the check cleared, Summerhays instructed Lawrence to 
distribute the proceeds of the settlement, 3 8 percent to Summerhays 
and the balance to Ward. R. 198. 
8. The insurance check was issued as full settlement of 
Ward's personal injury claim. R. 198, 387. 
9. In compliance with the instructions of Summerhays, 
Lawrence deposited the checks into his trust account and 
distributed the sums to Ward and Summerhays. R. 198, 3 84, 391. 
10. Dr. Burns was never been paid on the lien or claim which 
he had against the proceeds of Ward's personal injury action. R. 
198. 
4 
11. A 1 thougl i I iawrence endorsed t:I le sett 1 eiiieiit: ^hec] : 
deposited it in his trust account,, and disbursed the proceeds of 
the personal injury settlement, he received no compensation from 
V • * , R * , , 
12. Lawrence did not: discover whether third parties' claims 
on che oersona :; • •. rr- proceeds were satd sf i ed. " 
know! ^ aq-:: .. ' ..e claim .ii;.: 1 i pn of Dr. Burns. R 199. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The rinal court correctly concluded that Lawrence's acts of 
end:' '-"*:: :• ::i t::ii :i ig, and d i strd bi ltd i lg tl le 
established in attorney-client relationship with Ward. Regardless 
of whether Lawrence had an attorney-client relationship with Ward, 
as ai I at tor nej - whose 
property he received. Lawrence breached that duty by distributing 
the funds without' satisfying the assignment and lien of Dr. Burns. 
Lawrence fall:-; I n . ippropr lately inai i/,ha I 1 I h^ evidence to 
attack the factual findings and the reasonable inferences from the 
factual findings which were determined by the trial court. The 
trial • :: o i 11: t s i: e f u s a 1 t o d i s m :i s s 1) i: B u i: n s c 1 a i m s h o u 1 d be 
sustained. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LAWRENCE BREACHED HIS DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES 
WHEN HE FAILED TO DISTRIBUTE THE PERSONAL INJURY 
PROCEEDS TO THE ASSIGNEE AND LIEN HOLDER, DR. BURNS 
Dr. Burns treated Ward for injuries in May, 1990. R. 197, 
367. In exchange for the medical services, Ward granted Dr. Burns 
a doctor's lien and assignment of benefits on the proceeds of his 
personal injury action. R. 197. Ward was represented in his 
personal injury action by Summerhays, an attorney with 32 years of 
experience in the practice of law. R. 337-38. When the case was 
about to settle, Summerhays contacted the insurance company and 
instructed it to make the settlement check payable to Lawrence and 
Ward. R. 197. Lawrence was an attorney with whom Ward had 
previously consulted. R. 375. Summerhays informed Lawrence of Dr. 
Burns' lien. R. 198. Summerhays scheduled a meeting between Ward, 
Lawrence and Summerhays, which took place in December, 1991. R. 
339. At that meeting, the settlement check of $6,500 was endorsed 
by Ward and Lawrence, deposited into Lawrence's trust account, and 
after the funds had cleared, distributed in its entirety to Ward 
and Summerhays by Lawrence. R. 198, Addendum "E". 
Dr. Burns' claim is based on Lawrence's breach of duty to 
distribute funds to the third party owner. Dr. Burns claimed that 
an attorney who received his client's personal injury proceeds must 
exercise due diligence to discover and satisfy third-party claims 
on those proceeds. Dr. Burns presented James B. Lee, Attorney at 
Law, to establish the standard of care for distributing personal 
6 
injury proceeds Lee testified that an attorney has a duty ' o 
determine the existence of third-party claims against personal 
injury proceeds and to satisfy them The breach of that duty is 
malpractice.. 219-2( Lee also referred to Rule 1.13 . :f the 
Rules of P.- Dfessiona" * • .:. ! as evii dence of the standard t ' -.ire 
for attorneys. He ;^;i:r:^d that the Rules do not establish the 
standard : care, ";;ut they are evidence of the standard of care. 
R. 22 
Rule 1.13 Safekeeping Property. 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which 
a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as 
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by 
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly 
deliver to the client or third person any funds or other 
property that the client or third person is entitled to 
receive and, upon request by the client or third person, 
shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such 
property. 
Rules of Prof ess iona ] Condi ict • Ri lie 1 1 3 . The Commei it to tl le Rule 
states that a lawyer should hold property of others with the care 
required of a professional fiduciary. As if addressing the 
circumstances of this case the Comment states: 
Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may 
have just claims against funds or other property in a 
lawyers custody. A lawyer may have a duty under 
applicable law to protect such third-party claims against 
wrongful interference by the client and accordingly may 
refuse to surrender the property to the client. 
Rules i Professional Conduct. Rule Comment. 
The trial court held that in light of the standard of care 
established by Lee and reflected in Rule 1.13, Lawrence breached 
7 
the standard of care and his duty to Dr. Burns by failing to 
satisfy Dr. Burns' lien and assignment. 
A. LAWRENCE'S ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ESTABLISHED AN ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
Lawrence asserts that he did not represent Ward, and since 
there was no representation, there could be no duties of 
representation imposed upon him. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
described the attorney-client relationship as follows: 
In general, except where an attorney is appointed by 
a court, the attorney-client relationship is created by 
contract. . . . The contract may be express or implied 
from the conduct of the parties. . . . The relationship 
is proved by showing that the party seeks and receives 
the advice of the lawyer in matters pertinent to the 
lawyer's profession. . . . Such a showing is subjective 
in that a factor in evaluating the relationship is 
whether the client thought an attorney-client 
relationship existed. . . . However, a party's belief 
that an attorney-client relationship exists, unless 
reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the 
attorney, is not sufficient to create a confidential 
attorney-client relationship. . . . In sum, "it is the 
intent and conduct of the parties which is critical to 
the formation of the attorney-client relationship." 
[Citations omitted] 
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990) . 
The conduct of Ward and Lawrence, by endorsing, depositing, and 
distributing the proceeds of the settlement check, establishes the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship. If Lawrence were not 
an attorney, would the insurance company have placed his name on 
the check settling all claims? If Lawrence were not an attorney, 
would Ward have entrusted the personal injury proceeds to 
Lawrence's trust account? If Lawrence were not an attorney, would 
Lawrence have distributed the proceeds of the personal injury 
8 
settlement check to Ward and Summerhays pursuant to instructions? 
Only because Lawrence was an attorney was the insurance company 
willing to draw the check in his name, allowing him to effectuate 
the final settlement of the personal injury action. Only because 
Lawrence was an attorney was he entrusted with the funds and 
authorized by Ward to distribute them. 
Similar to the determination of Utah law about the nature of 
attorney-client relationship, the Supreme Court of Iowa in 
Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977), stated: 
An attorney-client relationship ordinarily rests on 
contract, but it is not necessary that the contract be 
express or that a retainer be requested or paid. The 
contract may be implied from conduct of the parties. 
. . The relationship is created when (1) a person seeks 
advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or 
assistance sought pertains to matters within the 
attorney's professional competence, and (3) the attorney 
expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives 
the desired advice or assistance. . . . [Citations 
omitted] 
An attorney-client relationship was established between Ward and 
Lawrence based on the assistance Ward received from Lawrence. 
Summerhays and Ward gave Lawrence the settlement check and 
requested that Lawrence deposit the check and distribute the funds. 
Lawrence and Summerhays had already discussed Dr. Burns' doctor's 
lien, R. 197, and Ward's refusal to pay the doctor's bill. R. 385. 
Ward and Summerhays met with Lawrence, seeking his assistance to 
deposit and distribute the proceeds of the personal injury action. 
R. 381. Lawrence agreed to deposit the check, but refused to 
distribute the proceeds until the check had cleared, thus assuring 
that the funds were actually available. R. 408. Furthermore, 
9 
Lawrence actually provided the desired assistance to Ward by 
depositing and distributing those funds to Ward and Summerhays. R. 
409. Lawrence entered into an attorney-client relationship with 
Ward by depositing the funds, acting as a fiduciary entrusted with 
those funds, and then distributing those funds. 
Lawrence asserts that if no attorney-client relationship 
exists, he has no duty to Dr. Burns. But Lawrence had a duty to 
Burns whether or not he was engaged in an attorney-client 
relationship with Ward. As an attorney, Lawrence has a duty to 
manage third parties' funds which come into his possession. This 
duty is not contingent upon the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship. His duty is to preserve the funds and use due 
diligence to determine ownership. If a dispute arises, he should 
interplead the funds into court. 
The common law establishes that lawyers who receive property 
belonging to third parties are liable for its appropriate delivery. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 
1073 (1935) , held that an attorney who delivered funds to his 
client, despite knowing of his client's valid agreement to give 
one-third of the proceeds to a third party, was liable to the third 
party for the one-third share. The Court stated: 
This court has held that where a person receives funds 
knowing that they belong to another, he thereby becomes 
responsible for their payment to the owner, even though 
he received them from a third person and there is no 
contractual relation between him and the owner. See 
Yourt v. McKee, 1 Utah 281; . . . . 
Id. at 1076. Lawrence had the duty to pay Dr. Burns, even when 
there was no attorney-client contract or relationship. 
10 
The Idaho Court of Appeals ruled in Bonanza Motors Inc. v. 
Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 657 P.2d 1102 (Idaho App. 1983), that where a 
client assigned a creditor an interest in the proceeds from an 
action, and the assignment directed the law firm to pay directly to 
the creditor, the creditor had a cause of action against the 
attorney who paid the entire recovery to the client pursuant to the 
client's request. The client negotiated the attorney's draft 
without paying the creditor. The creditor sued on the assignment 
and obtained a summary judgment against the law firm. 
The New York Supreme Court has also held that an attorney with 
notice of an assignment of proceeds from a personal injury action 
by his client to a physician was liable to the physician for paying 
the settlement proceeds to the client in disregard of the 
assignment. The Court stated: "It is undisputed that the Defendant 
[attorney] . . . had notice of the assignment to Plaintiff, for 
medical services rendered, of a portion of the proceeds of his 
client's claim for personal injuries. Consequently, in paying out 
monies in disregard of such assignment, he is liable to Plaintiff 
for the resulting damage." Brinkman v. Moskowitz, 38 Misc. 2d 950, 
238 N.Y.S.2d 876, 876-77 (1962). 
Even if Lawrence did not have an attorney-client relationship 
with Ward, he nevertheless had the obligation to deliver the 
property to its proper owner. This is fundamental law and common 
sense for both attorneys and non-attorneys. 
11 
B. PAYMENT OF A FEE, OR LACK OF PAYMENT, DOES NOT DESTROY THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
Lawrence asserts that he had no attorney-client relationship 
with Ward because he received no payment for services. While 
payment of a fee may be an indicia of the attorney-client 
relationship, it is not required to establish such a relationship. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
. . . the payment of attorney fees does not by itself 
determine whether an attorney-client relationship exists, 
but is only one indicia. Hecht ["v. Superior Court, 192 
Cal. App. 3d 560,] 237 Cal. Rptr. [528] at 530; see also 
Huddleston v. State, 259 Ga. 45, 376 S.E.2d 683, 684 
(1989) (although the general test of employment is the 
fee, the basic question with regard to an attorney-client 
relationship is whether advice or assistance of the 
attorney is both sought and received). 
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 728 (Utah App. 1990) . 
Since Lawrence's assistance in depositing and distributing the 
personal injury proceeds was received by Ward, regardless of a fee, 
the attorney-client relationship was established. 
C. THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT MAY BE UTILIZED TO 
ESTABLISH THE STANDARD OF CARE 
Lawrence objects to the use of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct to establish the standard of care of attorneys claiming 
that the Rules specifically deny a private cause of action arising 
from the violation of any of its provisions. This issue was 
specifically addressed in Waldman v. Levine. 544 A.2d 683 (D.C. 
App. 1988) : 
Appellants further object to the trial court's 
admission of [expert] testimony that he had considered 
various provisions of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility for Lawyers in determining what was the 
appropriate standard of care for an attorney in 
12 
appellants' circumstances. Appellants contend that 
because the Code provides no private cause of action for 
its violation, any testimony about it was both irrelevant 
to appellants' liability for negligence and extremely 
prejudicial. 
Although it may be true that the Code provides no 
private cause of action for its violation, . . . a 
question we need not decide, the issue is whether the 
standards set by the Code are relevant to establishing 
the standard of care governing an attorney's conduct. A 
number of courts have held that although the Code does 
not attempt to delineate the boundaries of civil 
liability for the professional conduct of attorneys, its 
provisions constitute some evidence of the standards 
required of lawyers. See, Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 
924, 936 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 888, 101 
S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 114 (1980); Menzel v. Morse, 362 
N.W.2d. 465, 471 (Iowa 1985) (Code is evidence of 
requisite skill and knowledge of member of legal 
profession)(dictum); Martinson Bros, v. Hiellum, 359 
N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D.1985)(Code violations constitute 
rebuttable evidence of legal malpractice) / see also. Van 
Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641, 645 n. 1 (Alaska 
1981) (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting). Other courts, 
although not faced with the precise issue presented here, 
looked to the Code for guidance on the proper standard of 
conduct for attorneys. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 
2d 136, 146-47, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968); Ishmael v. 
Millinaton, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526-27, 50 Cal. Rptr. 
592, 595-96 (1966); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 
23 Md. App. 280, 302, 327 A.2d 891, 904-05 & n. 10 
(1974) ; Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 93-98, 538 
P.2d 1238, 1249-51 (1975) (disciplinary rules have status 
of rule of court). 
It is an obvious proposition that the Code of 
Professional Conduct, provides a gauge by which to 
determine the competency of the Bar. See, Preamble and 
Preliminary Statement to Code of Professional 
Responsibility, D.C. Court Rules Annotated (1987) 
Appendix A, at 133-34. See also D.R. 6-101 (A) (1) & (2) 
(lawyer shall not handle legal matter which he knows he 
is not competent to handle or undertake representation 
without preparation adequate in the circumstances). A 
legal expert's use of the Code in determining the 
standard of care required in a legal malpractice case is 
not unlike the use of practice codes in other negligence 
contexts. [Citations omitted]. 
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Id at 690-91. James Lee testified that based on his experience as 
president and chairmen of the board of Parsons Behle & Latimer for 
15 years, member of the State committee to review the Rules of 
Professional Conduct before their implementation, State Bar 
President, ten year member of the three person committee at Parsons 
Behle & Latimer which reviews ethical problems, malpractice, and 
professional conduct for the 102 lawyer firm, he could render an 
opinion on the standard of care owed by attorneys to their clients 
and third parties. R. 214-15. Mr. Lee testified that he believed 
that the Rules of Professional Conduct "provide evidence" of what 
the standard of care should be. R. 221-22. The Rules of 
Professional Conduct may not be the basis for civil liability, but 
they may appropriately be used as evidence of an attorney's 
standard of care. 
Lawrence also claims that Rule 1.13 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct was "dispositive" in establishing his duty to 
third parties. This, however, is not the case. James Lee 
testified that his knowledge of the standard of care was based on 
a career of service and experience with professional ethics. In 
addition, the common law, far before the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, required an attorney who received funds belonging to a 
third party to deliver those funds to the third party, or be liable 
to the third party. See, Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P. 2d 
1073 (1935); Bonanza Motors Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 657 P.2d 
1102 (Idaho App. 1983) ; Brinkman v. Moskowitz, 38 Misc. 2d 950, 
238 N.Y.S.2d 876, 876-77 (1962). The standard of care is, 
14 
therefore, derived from many sources, including common law, 
experience in the industry, and published standards and 
requirements. To characterized the trial court's use of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct in determining the standard of care as 
"dispositive", ignores the breadth of experience and understanding 
of the standard of care established in the testimony. 
POINT II 
LAWRENCE'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
Lawrence asserts that his motion to dismiss or for a directed 
verdict was improperly denied by the trial court. He claims that 
there was no evidence in the record establishing that the holder of 
the lien, Spine Institute of Utah, was the same as the Plaintiff, 
Dr. Burns. With no analysis or legal support, Lawrence claims that 
the trial court "ignored the clear weight of the evidence" and that 
11
 [t] here is absolutely no place in the record below showing that 
Appellee [Burns] is in fact 'Spine Institute', or has any 
assignment from Spine Institute, or any right to maintain the 
lawsuit in the Spine Institute's behalf." Brief of Appellant, p. 
11. Despite these contentions, Lawrence fails to meet his burden 
to establish that the trial court should be reversed. To prevail 
on this issue, Lawrence must establish that the findings of the 
trial court were "clearly erroneous". This Lawrence has failed to 
do. He fails to marshal the evidence to justify his petition for 
reversal. 
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The Court of Appeals has delineated how appellants must attack 
the trial court's findings of fact. In West Valley City v. 
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991), the 
Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
In order to successfully challenge the trial court's 
decision, where it is premised on factual interpretation 
. . . , the [appellant] must begin by undertaking the 
arduous and painstaking marshalling process. . . . After 
marshalling the evidence supporting the trial court's 
finding, the [appellant] must then show that these same , 
findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the 
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them clearly 
erroneous." Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neil, 783 
P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
The marshalling process is not unlike 
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate 
himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the duty of marshalling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
the trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw 
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that 
the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. 
"Appellants often overlook or disregard this heavy 
burden." Jd. In the present case, appellant has 
acknowledged the requirement but mis-perceived it. See 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 
(Utah App. 1991) . As in Heinecke, the [appellant] has 
presented a general catalogue of evidence. What the 
[appellant] has not done is to correlate particular items 
of evidence with the challenged findings and convince us 
of the Court's missteps in application of the evidence to 
its findings. The findings, then, have not been shown to 
be clearly erroneous. In the instant appeal, the 
challenge to the legal conclusions rises and falls with 
the factual findings sought to be challenged. 
Accordingly, we leave undisturbed the Court's findings 
and conclusions based thereon. 
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West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991) . See also, Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 
1989); Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986); Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court held that " . . . any substantial 
evidence [in the record] will support the findings and judgement" 
[emphasis added] . Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 
1975) . Any substantial evidence supporting the findings in the 
judgment satisfies the "clear weight of the evidence" test and such 
findings and judgment are not "clearly erroneous." Nielsen v. 
Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980). "Any substantial 
evidence" is satisfied unless there is no reasonable basis for the 
findings. Id. 
Therefore, the duty of the court of appeals relating to an 
attack on the facts is: 
. . . to follow the cardinal rules of review; to 
indulge [the facts found by the trial court] a 
presumption of validity and correctness; to require the 
appellant to sustain the burden of showing error; to 
review the record in the light most favorable to them; 
and not to disturb them if they find substantial support 
in the evidence. 
Charleston v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2nd 1176 (1961). 
Lawrence has failed to correlate particular items of 
supportive evidence with the challenged findings to expose the 
trial court's missteps in the application of the evidence to its 
findings. The findings, then, have not been shown to be clearly 
erroneous. 
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Substantial evidence exists in the record to support the 
findings and ruling denying the motion to dismiss or for a directed 
verdict. Dr. Burns treated Ward, had him sign a doctor's lien and 
Assignment of Benefits to protect his interest, R. 197, 332, and 
had contact with Summerhays in relation to the personal injury 
action. R. 362. Dr. Burns' name appears at the top of the 
Doctor's Lien document. Addendum "C". The Spine Institute of Utah 
is not designated as a separate or independent entity from Dr. 
Burns and as a d/b/a of Dr. Burns, Dr. Burns is personally entitled 
to enforce any agreements made with his patients despite the use of 
an assumed name. 
Furthermore, Lawrence does not attack the Assignment of 
Benefits which was executed by Ward and is a basis for Dr. Burns' 
claim against the proceeds of Ward's personal injury action. The 
Assignment of Benefits, Addendum "D", is in the name of the 
Plaintiff, "Brian D. Burns, D.C., d/b/a Burns Chiropractic Clinic." 
and assigns the recovery from any action to Dr. Burns to the extent 
of his medical bills. It also provides for a lien against the 
recovery in personal injury actions. Since Dr. Burn's claim to the 
proceeds of Ward's personal injury action was established for and 
in the name of Dr. Burns in both the Doctor's Lien and Assignment 
of Benefits, the record contains substantial support for the 
findings of the trial court and the motion to dismiss or for 
directed verdict was properly denied. 
Since Lawrence fails to marshall the evidence, the Court of 
Appeals should uphold the factual findings of the trial court and 
18 
affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss and for a 
directed verdict. "We have shown no reluctance to affirm when the 
appellant fails to adequately marshal the evidence." West Valley 
City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 
1991). 
CONCLUSION 
The rulings of the trial court, in finding that Lawrence had 
an attorney-client relationship with Ward and that the Rules of 
Professional Conduct may be utilized as evidence of the standard of 
attorney care, are justified under any standard of review. 
Delivery of the personal injury settlement check to Lawrence was an 
attempt to circumvent the obligation to pay Dr. Burns his fees for 
medical services, secured by the Doctor's lien and the Assignment 
of Benefits. 
Lawrence has failed to marshall the evidence to establish that 
the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss or for a directed 
verdict should be reversed. Without proper marshalling of the 
evidence, there can be no reversal. The record contains 
substantial evidence justifying the trial court's denial of the 
motion. The Spine Institute is not shown to be an entity separate 
from Dr. Burns personally. In addition, the Assignment of 
Benefits, which is not attacked by Lawrence, grants Dr. Burns an 
interest in the proceeds of the personal injury recovery and a 
doctor's lien in those proceeds. 
The trial court was justified in its rulings and its judgment 
should be affirmed. 
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DATED this #15^ day of March, 1996. 
day of 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
brief was hand delivered to the following on this 
March, 1996: 
Victor Lawrence, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
10 West Broadway, Suite 211 
Salt Lake City, Utah^ 84101 
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Addendum A Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-6686 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C. d/b/a 
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and 
VICTOR LAWRENCE 
Defendants. 
AMENDFD FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 930004651 CV 
: Judge Reece 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the 
Honorable Judge Robin W. Reece pursuant to the trial setting in the 
above-entitled matter. Testimony was received by the Court on May 
15, 1995, and again on August 15, 1995. The court having reviewed 
the files and records herein, having received the testimony of the 
witnesses, having received the arguments of counsel and for good 
cause appearing, therefore does hereby issue the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Dr. Burns treated John Ward in May of 1990. 
2. To insure payment, Dr. Burns received an assignment of 
benefits and a doctor's lien from Mr. Ward. 
3. The lien was signed by Mr. Ward and by Mr. Summerhays or 
some member of Mr. Summerhays' office staff. 
4. Late in 1991, the personal injury action o- Mr. Ward was 
O^i l.V^K)^, 
settled. Mr. Summerhays negotiated that settlement with the 
insurance company and instructed the insurance company to make a 
check payable to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward. 
5. In September, 1991, Mr. Lawrence initiated a call to Mr. 
Summerhays. Mr. Summerhays and Mr. Lawrence discussed the value of 
the personal injury claim of Mr. Ward. Mr. Summerhays told Mr. 
Lawrence that Dr. Burns had a lien against the settlement proceeds 
and informed Mr. Lawrence of Mr. Summerhays' attorney's fees. 
6. In December, 1991, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Summerhays, and Mr. 
Ward met in Lawrence's office. The meeting was arranged by Mr. 
Summerhays. At that meeting, Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward endorsed 
the settlement check. 
7. Mr. Summerhays instructed Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward to 
endorse the settlement check and instructed Mr. Lawrence to deposit 
that check. After the check cleared, Mr. Summerhays instructed Mr. 
Lawrence to distribute the proceeds of the settlement, 3 8 percent 
to Mr. Summerhays and the balance to Mr. Ward. 
8. The insurance check was issued as full settlement of the 
personal injury claim of Mr. Ward. 
9. In compliance with the instructions of Mr. Summerhays, Mr. 
Lawrence deposited the checks into his trust account and 
distributed the sums to Mr. Ward and Mr. Summerhays. 
10. Dr. Burns has never been paid on the lien or claim which 
he had against the proceeds of the personal injury action of Mr. 
Ward. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. When Mr. Lawrence endorsed the settlement check, deposited 
.-.'' v. \ u V , 
t h i s fS day of Qctol5e^r'i995\ A 
/? / r ^ ^  * ft 
iiBytthe ,Courts : 'I 
* * \ zrv — - ••..*-.. .1 % 
Rob:3fc3g£L&<3gge, Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that i caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing tcj victor Lawrence, 10 West Broadway Suite 311, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, this IQ day of 
October, 1995. 
Addendum B Judgment 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-6686 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BRIAN D. BURNS B.C. d/b/a 
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and 
VICTOR LAWRENCE 
Defendants. : 
JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. ^0004651 CV 
Judge Jfeege 
The above-entitled matter canTe on regularly before the 
Honorable Judge Robin W. Reece pursuant to the trial had in this 
matter, the Court having reviewed the files and records lerein, 
having received the testimony of the witnesses, having received the 
arguments of counsel, having reviewed the legal au-hority 
presented, and for good cause appearing, therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be 
entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of 
$2,060.00, plus prejudgment interest of $858.33, plus costs of 
$74.00, for a total judgment of $2,992.33, plus post-judgment 
interest to accrue at the legal rate of 9.22 percent per annum. 
DATED t h i s 2L cay of Sep tember , 
By t h e /Courpr ' 
Robin\Wc> Ree^e , Judge 
V<?" 
MAILING CERTIFICATED. 
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, this & 
day of September, 1995: 
Victor Lawrence 
Att ^ rney at Law 
10 West Broadway, Suite 311 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Addendum C Medical Reports and Doctor's Lien 
Spine Institute of Utah 
B**NBUMS. DC. ROBEOT^WOJMOttJ M 0. 
CWW0WWC7IC WV8/C/AK 0KIHWHWC * V*G£ OW 
RE: MEDICAL RETORTS AND DOCTOR'S UEN 
l do hurebv authorize SPINE INSTITUTE to furnish you, my attorney, with a full 
report of examination, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, etc , of myself in regarc to tto ecciaent which I 
was recently involved. 
I hereby authorize and direct you, my attorney, to pay directly tc said clinic such sums es may bo cue end 
owing for meaicai service renderec me both by reason of this evident end by reason of any other bills that 
ere due the clinic e^d to witnnoic such Bums from any settlement, judgment or verdict as may be 
necessary to edeouateiy protect said ci»mc. And 1 hereby furtner give a Lien on my cese to said clinic 
agmnst any and ali proceeds of mv sentemem. judgment or veroc: which may be paid tc you. my attorney, 
cr myself, as the result of the Injuries for which I have been treated 01 injuries *r. connection therewith. 
i agree never tc rescind tins document and that a rescission will no: be honored by my attorney. I hereby 
instruct that m the event another attorney is substituted in this matter, the new attorney honor this lien as 
»nr>erem to the settlement ens enforceable upon the case es if it were executec by him 
l fully understand tnat I am Erectly and fully resoonsibte tc Mid clinic for oil nodice! bills submitted for 
service rencered me anc the: this agreement is made soley lor said clinic's additional protection and in 
consideration of awaiting payment. And I further understand that such poymerv; <s not contingent on any 
settlement, juogrnent or verd'Ci by when I may eventually recover sale fee. 
Please acknowledge this lener by signing oelow and returning to the Spine Institute * have been advised 
that rf my anorney does nc: wisn to cooperate in protecting the clinic's interest, the cimic will not await 
payment but will recuire me tc make payments on ^ -current bask * \
 A IK. n 
Dated Sjj J06 
Patient's Signati 
^oJiJLy _ _ _ _ _ _ l ^ C 
:ure 
The unce.-signed being aUcne* o- record for the sbcvecp&tieni ooes hereby agree to ooserve a!i the terms 
of tne above and agree?; tc withhold Such sums from any settlement, juogrnent, or verdict 8$ may be 
necessary tc adecuately protect seid clinic above-named. 
Attomev's Signature. < ^ ^ - ^ < ^ / ^tf^^^Z^^^^^^ J. 
Please sign, date, anc return one copy to Some Institute Also keep one copy for your records 
* *. yM P C i iSPLWA*J 1/t/tfO 
J K —»* » »~v-< 
**rv* 5— vi HlJl I Q 
630 East 4500 Sou:h, Sulic 300 SaJt Lake City, Utah 84107 (SOI) 265-2700 
Addendum D Assignment of Benefits 
To Brian D. Burns, D.C. 
aba BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC 
ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFITS 
The undersigned patient and/or responsible party, in addition to continuina personal 
responsibility, and in consideration of treatment rendered or to be rendered assigns to the 
physician or facility named above the following rights, power, and authority: 
RELEASED INFORMATION: You are authorized to release and to permit the examination or copvina 
of anv of mv medical records, x-ravs. laboratorv reports, and the results of al! tests o? 
any type or'character to such person(s) as the physician and/or facility deems appropriate. 
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS: You are assigned to exclusive, irrevocable riaht to any cause of 
action that exists in my favor aaainst any insurance company or other person or entity to 
the extent of your bill for totaT services, includina the exclusive, irrevocable riaht to 
receive payment for such services, make aemanc in mv'name for payments, and prosecute anc 
receive penalties, interest, court costs, or other legally compensable amounts owea by an 
insurance company or other person or entitv. I, as tfie patient and/or responsible party, 
further agree to cooperate, provide information as needed, and appear as needed, wherever to 
assist in the prosecution of such claims for benefits upon reauest. The physician anc/or 
facility is also assigned the exclusive, irrevocable right to reauest and receive from any 
insurance company or health care plan anv and all information and aocuments pertaining to my 
policies including a copy of such policv* and any information or suoDortinc documentation 
concerning or touching upon the handling, calculation, processing, or payment of any claim. 
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT: To anv insurance comoanv providina benefits of any kind to me/us for 
treatment renaered by the physician/faci Iitv'named abovet you are herepy tendered demand to 
pay in full the bill for services rendered by the physician/facility named above following 
your receipt of such bill for services to the extent'such bills are'pavaole under the terms 
of mv/our bolicv for benefits, less any amounts wnich I/we owe personally which are not 
payable under the terms of your policy. 
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY: If patient(s) treatments for injuries are the result of the 
nealicence of any third party, then patient(s) arant a lien aaainst any recovery from such 
tn7rcwparty(s) to tne extent of the bills for treatment in favor of the physician/faci I;:y 
named above. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Patient(s) waive the riaht to claim any Statute of Limitations 
recarcinc claims for services renaerec cr to be renaered by the pnysician/faciIity namec 
above. 
ATTORNEY FEES: Patient(s) acrees to pav for reasonable costs of collection (both pre and 
post judaement) including attornev fees-and court costs, for services renaerec by tne 
pnysiciari/faci I i ty namea above. 
LIMITED PCWER OF ATTORNEY: I hereby arant to the phvsici an/f aci I \ tv named above power :o 
enaorse mv name uocn any checks, drafts, or ether negotiable instrument representing payment 
from any insurance company representinc payment for treatment and health care renaerec by 
phvsician/faciIitv. i acree that anv Insurance payment representing an amount in excess of 
the cnaraes for t^eatmenf rendered will be creciteS to my/our account or forwardec :o my/our 
aadress upon reauest in writing to the physician/facility namec above. 
In the event that any provision of this Aareement is determined to be invalid or 
unenforceacie, all otner provisions of thTs Agreement shall remain enforceable. 
A PHOTOCOPY OF THIS INSTRUMENT SHALL SERVE AS ORIGINAL 
Date 
STATE OF LTAH 
Before me this dav personally appeared to oerson(s) wnose signature(s) appear above wnc oy 
me being duiv sworn upon oatn say(s) tnat the statements set forth aoove are true anc 
correct. Subscribed and sworn before me this cay of 19 
Notary Public Salt Lake Countv, Utah - -
NOTARY P C S U m 
My commission expires / 
Addendum E January 14, 1992 Letter from Defendant Lawrence to 
Plaintiff 
VICTOR LAWRENCE 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
323 SOUTH 600 EAST, Sum ISO 
SALT LAKE CfTY, UTAH 84102 
TELEPHONE (801) 15943600 
FAX (802) 521-5731 
January 14, 1992 
Burns Chiropractic Care 
650 East 4500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-2900 
Re: Account # 2WAR.13; Account # 2WARJ; John Ward 
To Whom It May Concern: 
1 have received correspondence in the form of a billing 
statement from your office in regard to the above-referenced 
accounts for Mr. John Ward. 
Please note in your records that my office does not represent 
Mr. Ward. 
On December 9, 1991 Mr. Ward received a settlement check 
payable to him and myself. Evidently there was some confusion as 
Mr. Ward's attorney of record, Lowell Summerhays, had withdrawn 
and/or erroneously informed the insurance company defendant that 
I would be substituting in Mr. Summerhays1 place. 
So as not to hold up the settlement I agreed to deposit those 
funds in my trust account. When the check cleared my account I 
disbursed $1,365.00 to Mr. Summerhays and the entire remaining 
balance, $5,135.00 to Mr. Ward. I had no claims for any amounts 
because I was not representing Mr. Ward. 
I informed Mr. Ward that I could not enter his litigation case 
midstream. It was also my understanding that other parties, your 
office included, may have asserted liens on those particular funds. 
I was not willing to get involved. I endorsed the check because 
my name was on it and I had no rights to such funds. I deposited 
it in my trust account because I needed to verify that it would 
clear before I was willing to release any sums to Mr. Ward or 
anyone else. 
I did instruct Mr. Ward that if any other party, Mr. 
Summerhays, your office, etc., had a lien on any of those funds, 
he would be responsible to pay the same and I would be unable to 
defend him as to such for the reason stated above; i.e., I am 
simply unwilling to enter this case midstream. 
If there are any questions or if additional discussion would 
be helpful, please call at your earliest convenience. 
j i i ( , 
Bums Chiropractic Care 
January 14, 1992 
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